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WhatWould 
You Do lf ... ? 
Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research and the 
Defense of the 1 nnocent 
M. THERESE LYSAUGHT 
Into whatever city you go, after they welcome 
you, eat what they set befare you, and cure the 
sick there. Say to them, The reign of God is 
at hand (Luke ro:9 ). 1 
CHAPTER 
10 
This passage, and St. Luke's continuing presence to us in the 
communion of saints, issues an important reminder that should 
shape our inquiry into the ethics of human embryonic stem cell 
research. That reminder is this: healing is a sign of the Kingdom 
of God. Healing was a fundamental component of Jesus' min-
istry, as witnessed in the gospels. Healing is central to God's 
identity as disclosed through revelation. As this particular pas-
sage from Luke notes, healing is part of the commission Jesus 
gives to those he sends out into the world to preach the good 
news of the kingdom. Healing, therefore, ought to be central to 
the ways of discipleship and Christian reflection today. 
The centrality of healing to the mission of Christian disci-
pleship is witnessed not only in Scripture but in the historie 
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commitment of the Roman Catholic tradition to the practice 
of healing and support of health. Nowhere is this commitment 
more evident than in the marked presence of Catholic hospi-
tals and allied health care organizations. The origin of hospitals 
can be traced to Christian practices of caring for the sick, and 
for centuries communities of religious women and men in the 
church have dedicated themselves to the apostolate of caring 
for the sick and the dying. 2 Currently, Catholic hospitals con-
stitute over 16 percent of all community hospital beds and ad-
missions in the United States. Not simply an ideal, the Catho-
lic commitment to healing is concretely embodied and enacted 
in our contemporary context. 3 
1 begin with this reminder because the Christian commit-
ment to healing is often obscured or ignored by those who cari-
cature and dismiss Catholic arguments against human embry-
onic stem cell research. The arguments of Catholics or other 
groups who inveigh against human embryonic stem cell re-
search, in the words of Glenn McGee andArthur Caplan, are il-
logical and bizarre. McGee and Caplan accuse opponents of 
holding that embryos are special people who can never be al-
lowed to die and ofascribing to embryos a sort of super status 
that outweighs the needs of others in the community.4 Not only 
do such claims distort the arguments in question, but they ab-
stract Catholic claims and arguments against human embryonic 
stem cell research from the broader narratives and practices out 
of which they emerge. This cannot but render them unintelli-
gible. In order to avoid such misrepresentation, we need to be 
mindful of the centrality of healing to the practice of the Chris-
tian life and the historie embodiment of this commitment in the 
Catholic tradition in the broader context of the debate about 
the moral propriety of human embryonic stem cell research. 
This said, in this paper 1 will examine what has emerged as 
the central moral question surrounding human embryonic stem 
cell research, at least within the public debate. 5 The question 
has been phrased in different ways, so 1 will offer three versions. 
First, Kenneth Woodward summarizes the issue in Newsweek: 
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What value should we place on human embryos, he asks, and 
how should their well-being be balanced with that of the mil-
lions whose acute suffering might be alleviated through stem 
cell research and development? 6 The logic of this appeal is un-
dilutedly utilitarian. But, as savvy proponents of human em-
bryonic stem cell research know, utilitarian calculus, while in-
escapably operative for most moral agents , is generally deemed 
insufficient, especially when human lives occupy both sides of 
the equation. Consequently, a second appeal is often launched, 
one that more subtly individualizes the question. It is usually 
presented as an image or a narrative rather than as a direct ques-
tion. Those who followed the controversy as it evolved may re-
member Mollie and Jackie Singer, 12-year-old twins who spoke 
ata congressional hearing in July 2001, urging President Bush 
to permit federal funding for human embryonic stem cell re-
search. Mollie is afflicted with diabetes, and Jackie appealed 
for stem cell research to advance in arder that her sister might 
be spared the debilitating effects of the di seas e. 7 Or one may 
remember the photo dominating the extended coverage by The 
New York Times of President Bush's decision the Sunday after 
his announcement. In the photo, Charles and Jeri Queenan and 
their four children soberly watch Bush's August 9th address. The 
Queenans' daughter Jenna, also twelve years old, struggles with 
juvenile diabetes, too, and they hope human embryonic stem 
cell research might cure her. 8 
Mollie, Jackie , Jenna-this second appeal comes in the 
images and stories of children whose acute suffering might be 
alleviated through stem cell research. The crux of this appeal 
is simple. The images whisper: What if this were your child? 
lndeed, this question is not only whispered. Sooner or later, in 
any effort to question the moral propriety of human embryonic 
stem cell research, one can expect a challenge that seems, for 
the challenger, to be the moral trump card: What would you 
do if one of your children needed therapy generated by human 
embryonic stem cell research? What if your child had a ter-
rible disease , and stem cell research provided the only or best 
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possible hope for the alleviation or eradication of the disease? 
Could you stand against it then?9 The challenge brings argu-
ment to an end. Only a moral barbarían could argue against 
pursuing a therapy that could possibly relieve the suffering or 
forestall the early death of a child, particularly one's own child. 
Prescinding for a moment from the obvious emotive appeal 
to feelings of parental succor and obligation, one could argue 
that this challenge, as well as the utilitarian version of the 
question stated earlier, paints the situation as one of defense 
of the innocent. Here we have an innocent: a family member, 
a child, a multitude that is threatened by an aggressor (in this 
case, a disease) .10 The individual is appealed toas the one who 
has the power or ability to come to the defense of the innocent 
victim. 11 The defense of the innocent victim against the ag-
gressor requires, unfortunately, the sacrifice of a human life. 12 
Is this a situation where the sacrifice of human life might 
be justified? McGee and Caplan, offering a third version of 
our questiori , claim that the central moral issues in stem cell 
research have to do with the criteria for moral sacrifices of 
human life. 13 What might such criteria look like? Where might 
we find moral criteria for justifying the sacrifice of one human 
life in arder to save another or to protect the common good? 
Three classic examples , centrally located within the Chris-
tian tradition , provide a starting point from which to begin to 
address this question. These are: (1) the justification of self-
defense, offered in one instance by Thomas Aquinas; (2) the 
classic situation of defense of one's family member or neigh-
bor against a malicious attacker, helpfully analyzed by the late 
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder; and (3) the just 
war tradition. 14 
These three situations share certain structural features with 
the current debate. First, in each situation, an "innocent" (i.e. , 
the self, the family member, one's nation) has been or is being 
attacked. Second, in each situation, the taking of human life is 
presented as the only, primary, or last option, and it is required 
to defend the life of an "innocent" third party. Thus, each sce-
-
What Wou/d You Do lf . .. ? 1 1 71 
nario can be described as one in which the taking of human 
life might be justified in defense of the innocent, and each 
provides a classic site within the Christian tradition where 
moral theologians have struggled with the question of the 
justified taking of human life. 
One might object that these analogies will be of limited rele-
van ce to human embryonic stem cell research insofar as they 
concern, not health care, but violen ce or war. I would suggest, 
however, that they are fitting for precisely this reason. For the 
rhetoric surrounding the human embryonic stem cell debate 
is rife with images of war. This is not, of course, necessarily 
specific to the human embryonic stem cell debate: much of 
this sort of rhetoric arises whenever a new biotechnology is de-
veloped and needs to be sold to political and public audiences 
in the U.S. While I will not create an exhaustive account of 
this here, a few examples will illustrate. 
Consider, for example, McGee and Caplan's article, "The 
Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research." 
One finds at least seven war-related images in as many pages. 
Those who seek to develop therapies from human embryonic 
stem ce lis are characterized as fighting a j ust war, a war against 
suffering caused by the whole gamut of diseases from Parkin-
son's to cancer to heart disease and more. 15 The annual mor-
tality of cancer, which might potentially be alleviated through 
human embryonic stem cell research, is compared to the num-
ber of people killed in both the Kosovo and Vietnam conflicts. 16 
Human embryonic stem cell research advocates planto sacri-
fice embryos for a revolutionary new kind of research. 17 Parkin-
son's disease is likened to a dictator dreaming up the most ne-
farious chemical war campaign. 18 Resonating with our current 
political situation, they note that adults and even children are 
sometimes forced to give life, but only in the defense, or at least 
interest, of the community's highest ideals and most pressing 
interests. 19 
McGee and Caplan are far from alone in employing this sort 
of rhetoric to frame the discussion about human embryonic 
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stem cell research. For many, and certainly for the media, clini-
cal medicine through the auspices of biotechnology is engaged 
in a war against disease, disability, suffering, and death. Regen-
erative technologies are referred to as revolutionary. The tools 
of research and the clinic are the medica! armamentarium. 
Those who suffer from particular illnesses are survivors. More-
over, the hyperdrive politicization of this current issue points 
to the familiar adage that politics is but war waged by other 
means. As Katharine Seelye notes, on August 9, 2oor, when 
George W. Bush finally revealed his decision about federal 
funding of human embryonic stem cell research, they chose 
to have Mr. Bush announce his decision in prime time on na-
tional television, a format that presidents traditionally reserve 
for explaining military actions or trying to extract themselves 
from difficult poli tic al binds. 20 
This rhetoric of war is , 1 think, not accidental. In a time of 
war, different rules apply. Rights and lives can be abrogated 
in ways that would be considered an outrage in peacetime. For 
reasons that will become clear, 1 would challenge the meta-
phor of war as the proper way of framing our understanding of 
clinical research. Yet that argument must wait. lnstead, for the 
moment 1 will accept the terms of the debate offered by advo-
cates of human embryonic stem cell research: that we are at 
war and that this creates a situation in which the sacrifice of 
human life may, nay must, be justified. 
If so, those who earnestly seek to justify the sacrifice of 
human life on moral grounds and who wish to do so in terms 
that transcend bald utilitarianism would do well to begin with 
traditional arguments that justify such sacrifice in analogous 
contexts. Traditional arguments have stood the test of time, 
have proved their power by admitting analogous transfer in 
other contexts, and have done so in a way premised on sub-
stantive moral claims. Should human embryonic stem cell re-
search fit with the structure of these arguments, a compel-
ling case could be made to advance its cause. With this in mind, 
1 turn now to consider the three analogies outlined above : 
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( r) Aquinas' justification of self-defense ; (2) the defense of 
one's family member or neighbor against a malicious attacker; 
and (3) just war. Each of these cases could be the subject of 
this paper in its own right, and my remarks will therefore be far 
from exhaustive. Instead, I will highlight the morally relevant 
features of each case and show how they illuminate the rheto-
ric that attends human embryonic stem cell research. 
THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE JUSTIFICATION 
OF SELF-DEFENSE 
A first case where the Christian tradition has permitted the 
sacrifice of one human life to save another is self-defense. The 
question of self-defense is worth examining not only asan in-
stance where killing might be justified in defense of the inno-
cent (i.e. , the self) , but insofar as arguments for the natural 
right to self-defense and protection of the common good form 
the basis of the just war tradition that will be examined below. 
The classic treatment of self-defense is found in Thomas 
Aquinas's Summa Theologica (II-II , q . 64, a. 7). Here Aquinas 
considers the question: Whether it is lawful to kili a man in 
self-defense? After noting that the tradition does not speak 
with one voice to this question , he concludes that it can be not 
unlawful. He notes: 
N othing hinders one act from having two effects , only one 
of which is intended, while the other is beside the inten-
tion. Now moral acts take their species according to what is 
intended, and not according to what is beside intention, 
sin ce this is accidental as explained above (43, 3; I- II, 12. r). 
Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects , 
one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the 
aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one's intention is to 
save one's own life , is not unlawful , seeing that it is natural 
to everything to keep itself in being, as far as possible. And 
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yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may 
be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. 
Wherefore, if a man, in self-defense, uses more than neces-
sary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force 
with moderation, his defense will be lawful. ... N or is it 
necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate 
self-defense in arder to avoid killing the other man, since 
one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of an-
other's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for 
the public authority acting for the common good as stated 
above (3), it is not lawful for amanto intend killing aman 
in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, 
who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this 
to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against 
the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with rob-
bers, although even these sin if they be moved by prívate 
animosity. 21 
Aquinas's analysis provides two possible starting points for 
those interested in developing criteria for sacrificing one human 
life for the sake of another, specifically, intention and public 
authority. 
Intention, for Aquinas, does not in itself justify an act, in this 
case, the act of self-defense. Rather, intention is that aspect of 
an action by which we can determine how it ought to be de-
scribed or categorized. As any good ethicist knows, 90 percent 
of the solution toa question líes in how it is described or (we 
could say) narrated. Our descriptions locate questions within 
a larger narrative, placing the question in proper relationship 
to relevant substantive claims that, taken together, point to the 
morally pertinent dimensions of the issue. 
In this case, then, an action whose direct intention is to 
save one's own life is (somewhat tautologically) properly cate-
gorized as an act of self-defense. Self-defense is justified by a 
broader web of concepts within Aquinas's system: the natural 
propensity toward self-preservation, our duty to care for one's 
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own life more than for another's, the virtue of justice (under 
which this discussion is located), and so on. Might advocates 
of human embryonic stem cell research be able to define the 
intention of the practice such that it naturally falls under a 
category that finds itself justified in relationship to substantive 
moral claims present in contemporary culture? Clearly, advo-
cates argue that, while human embryonic stem cell research 
requires the destruction of embryos, the intention of amelio-
rating suffering and preserving the lives of those with serious ill-
ness ought to locate it under a different heading-for example, 
promotion of the common good. 
Equally interesting, Aquinas allows public authorities todo 
what an individual cannot do, namely, to intend to kill a man 
in self-defense. In order for them todo so lawfully, they must 
refer the action to the public good. Given the recent controversy 
over the role the federal government ought to play in funding 
and oversight of human embryonic stem cell research, advo-
cates might make a case that a Thomistic framework could sup-
port the claim that human embryonic stem cell research would 
be more properly administered by public authorities aiming at 
the common good-i.e., the NIH and federal funding-than 
by the prívate sector. However, while the traditional case for 
self-defense seems to hold promise for constructing a justi-
fication for human embryonic stem cell research, the analogy 
between such research and self-defense breaks clown at a sig-
nificant number of points, rendering the self-defense argu-
ment of doubtful utility. 
First, the actor practice of human embryonic stem cell re-
search andan act of self-defense are structurally quite dissimi-
lar. Most obviously, human embryonic stem cell research lacks 
the binary nature of the act of self-defense: it is necessarily 
mediated by third parties (researchers, lab technicians, physi-
cians). Moreover, for Aquinas, in an act of self-defense the one 
justifiably killed is an aggressor. Human embryos clearly are 
not. For Thomas, even public authorities are limited in their 
ability to sacrifice life for the common good, being granted 
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permission by Aquinas only to take the lives of aggressors and 
sinners (11-11, q. 64, a. 3). 
Second, it is clear that in Aquinas's analogy, the effects of 
the one act are immediately related, if not simultaneous: in 
the same action by which I defend myself I simultaneously 
kill you. It is this simultaneity that allows Thomas to create 
what would otherwise rightly be called a fiction-the claim 
that there is only one direct intention, in spite of the two in-
separable effects. As the two effects of an act become sepa-
rated from each other in time, with subsequent actions re-
quired to effect the second outcome, our ability to ascribe a · 
single intention disappears . Sorne might wish to construe 
human embryonic stem cell research as one act or practice 
that has two inseparable effects: one desired and intended, 
the relief of suffering and the avoidance of death, and one not 
desired and therefore not directly intended-the destruction 
of embryos. However, given that these two effects are far re-
moved fromeach other in time, the legitimacy of this move 
becomes doubtful. 
Third, the intention to save one's own life-while helping 
one place the action in the proper moral category-is not it-
self sufficient to render the act lawful. As he notes, "and yet, 
though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be ren-
dered unlawful , if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore 
if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it 
will be unlawful : whereas if he repel force with moderation his 
defense will be lawful." Rather than being a loophole through 
which one might justify violence, Aquinas is clearly con cerned 
not to give license even toward the pursuit of a good end. The 
violence that is justified must be necessary to save one's own 
life. If, by any means , violence or the death of the aggressor may 
be avoided, the act becomes unlawful. With regard to human 
embryonic stem.cell research, the necessity of using embryonic 
stem cells and the ready availability of promising alternatives 
is precisely what is at issue. I will discuss both of these in more 
detail below. 
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In the interest of space, I will simply mention, rather than 
elaborate on, three additional points of difference. For Aquinas, 
a justified act of self-defense is an exception for both individuals 
and for public authorities . As Paul Ramsey notes: he does not 
say that it is intrinsically right to intend to kili an onrushing, un-
just assailant, and then apply this general rule to the case of ac-
tion in defense of the common good. Intending to kili a man as 
a means to the public good is clearly an exception to the basic 
rule ( which still remains in force) that no Christian shall intend 
to kili any man. 22 Relatedly, Aquinas is here attempting to justify 
actions, not practices. As exceptions, these are seen as ad hoc, 
one time, unavoidable acts-not as a systematically developed 
program of activity. Likewise, the actions are considered retro-
spectively rather than prospectively. The question is: Is this 
action that has already occurred, unfortunate though it may 
be, justifiable? The requirements of intention, simultaneity, and 
proportion render it difficult to imagine how one might prospec-
tively structure an act or practice that would not fall short on 
any of these measures. 23 
E ven the promise of intention dissolves upon closer analy-
sis. For Aquinas, once intention shifts from self-defense to any 
other intention, it becomes immediately unjustified. In the 
case of human embryonic stem cell research, advocates iden-
tify a range of possible uses for stem celllines (e.g., basic re-
search into the processes of human development, the testing 
of cosmetics and household products, and so on) in addition 
to curing diseases and saving lives. Most if not all of these ad-
ditional outcomes willlikely be more immediate. Moreover, as 
has been the case with so many other recent developments in 
biotechnology over the past fifteen years, it is more likely than 
not that we will find ourselves faced with yet another instance 
of what one might call the therapeutic shift, wherein the ini-
tial rhetor.ic presented in order to marshal public opinion and 
funding focuses almost exclusively on the therapeutic poten-
tia! of the new technology in question. After securing public 
support and becoming feasible, however, the technology takes 
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on a life of its own and becomes made available for any pur-
pose for which those with money can pay.24 
In the end, the classical justification of self-defense, as 
found in Aquinas, fails to provide a moral framework for the 
sacrificing of one human life for the sake of another in the 
practice of human embryonic stem cell research. lnstead, it 
offers a framework that seeks to minimize the violence we 
might naturally inflict on one another in the name of our own 
needs, desires, or even justice. 
WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF ... ? 
A second case where sorne within the Christian tradition have 
ahempted to justify sacrificing one life to save another would 
be that of killing an assailant in order to defend not the self 
but an innocent third party. This question is often raised, as 
John Howard Yoder notes, as a rejoinder to pacifist objections 
to war. As he observes at the beginning of his short book What 
Would You Do?: 25 
Sooner or later, in almost any serious discussion about peace 
and war, someone is sure to ask the standard question: "What 
would you do if a criminal, say, pulled a gun and threatened 
to kili your wife?" (or daughter or sister cir mother, whichever 
one the challenger decides to use). It's uncanny how many 
persons see this question as a way to test the consistency of 
the pacifist's convictions that war is wrong. 26 
Yoder tackles this question from two directions. He first un-
packs the assumptions implicit in the question, and then goes 
on to show how the situation of defense of a loved one differs 
significantly from the situation of war. The analogy, ~n other 
words, breaks clown. 
The parallel in the questions raised between the situations of 
war and human embryonic stem cell research is uncanny. And 
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like the attempt to analogize the defense of the innocent third 
party to the question of war, the attempt to draw this analogy to 
human embryonic stem cell research likewise breaks down. 27 
Therefore, rather than proceeding as I did with the question 
of self-defense (i.e. , outlining the analogy, identifying points 
of contact, and showing how it breaks clown), I will instead 
follow Yoder's lead and analyze the assumptions and dynamics 
at work in the rhetorical apparatus employed by advocates of 
human embryonic stem cell research. Yoder identifies six as-
sumptions that underlie the "what would you do if" question. 
Four will be explored here: determinism, control, knowledge, 
and alternatives. 
Determinism is a problem that afflicts the rhetoric sur-
rounding almost every new development in biotechnology. 28 
Not surprisingly, then, we find it in the human embryonic stem 
cell debate in spades. On a first level, advocates of human em-
bryonic stem cell research paint a scenario that unfolds me-
chanically. Something like the claim that "millions of people 
will suffer and die unless human embryonic stem cell research 
is pursued" is often made explicitly or by implication. For ex-
ample , Stanford biologist Irv Weissman has been quoted as 
saying: ¡¡Anyone who would ban research on embryonic stem 
cells will be responsible for the harm done to real , alive, post-
natal, sentient human beings who might be helped by this re-
search. Opponents are sacrificing these people to keep from 
destroying embryos in fertility-clinic freezers that will be thrown 
out anyway. "29 Or John Gearhart, one of the two researchers 
whose work initiated the public debate, notes that banning re-
search on embryonic stem cells could make "a lot of people in 
the future suffer needlessly and maybe even die."30 The con-
verse, "if we agree to allow the research, these people will be 
spared" is implied as well. 
The argument is not only deterministic in structure, it is 
also deterministic in time. In making their pitch, biotech ad-
vocates often like to work in factors of five , positing clinical 
therapies "within five years ," or "in a decade." Ron McKay, a 
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stem cell expert at the NIH, was, in November 2000, even 
more optimistic, promising that "in a few months it will be 
clear that stem cells will regenerate tissues. In two years, people 
will routinely be reconstituting liver, regenerating heart, rou-
tinely building pancreatic islets, routinely putting cells into 
brain that get incorporated into normal circuitry. They will rou-
tinely be rebuilding all tissues."31 
Such deterministic claims, of course , ignore important 
components of the situation. Essentially dismissing the wide 
range of other research endeavors that have been in process 
for decades, they ignore the possibility that other interventions 
might be developed to ameliorate the suffering of those afflicted 
by particular diseases. In creating the fiction of imminent clini-
cal application, they pretend that the untold millions cited will 
not, most likely, suffer and die an early death from their con-
ditions, since so much of research bears so little clinical fruit. 
Witness, for example, the unfulfilled promise of gene "ther-
apy." Moreover, these deterministic claims obscure the trou-
bling practica! reality that, should therapeutic applications 
be developed from human embryonic stem cell research, they 
will probably not be made available to most of the people who 
could benefit. The intractable issues of access to health care, 
social justice, and global inequities will not simply evaporate 
should human embryonic stem cell research bear fruit. 
Yoder's second charge is that the challenge "what would you 
do if" assumes "if not my omnipotence, at least my substantial 
control of the situation. lt assumes that if 1 seek to stop the at-
tacker, 1 can. Now in sorne cases," he admits, "this may be true, 
but in many it is by no means certain."32 This assumption like-
wise animates biotech rhetoric, of which advocacy of human 
embryonic stem cell research is but one example. The rhetoric 
assumes that if we seek to remedy a particular disease, we can. 
lt is only a matter of enough money, time, freedom, collabora-
tion, and scientific ingenuity. 
Moreover, in the case of human embryonic stem cell re-
search, this unwarranted optimism posits control not only over 
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one particular disease or condition, which might be more real-
istic and achievable, but over the en tire gamut of morbidity and 
mortality. lt is the ultimate panacea, the cure for everything. An 
historian of biotechnology might caution that human embry-
onic stem cell research falls in lineas only the most recent Holy 
Grail, a cousin of practices spanning organ transplantation to 
gene therapy that have met with limited or minimal success. 
This is not to suggest that human embryonic stem cell re-
search might not lead to the development of therapeutic op-
tions for specific diseases. lt very well may. But, as Yoder re-
minds us , the classic theory of just war ( to skip ahead for a 
moment) requires that the criterion of "probable success" be 
met befare innocent lives can be taken. In light of the difficul-
ties that well-funded, novel therapeutic paradigms have his-
torically encountered, coupled with the primitive state of em-
bryonic stem cell research , the probability of moving from 
theory to therapy, at least at this time, cannot be predicted. 
In making this point, however, 1 am getting ahead. Befare 
elaborating on the difficulty of characterizing the therapeutic 
success of human embryonic stem cell research as probable, 
we need to considera third assumption, namely, that of knowl-
edge. As Yoder notes , "The 'what if?' question presupposes, if 
not omniscience, at least full and reliable information."33 Like-
wise, the kinds of claims made in support of human embryonic 
stem cell research require a level of knowledge that is certainly 
not at hand and may well never be, even should such research 
be funded. For example, as those pursuing the promise of gene 
therapy have discovered, what one can coax human cells to do 
in the laboratory often proves impossible to convince them to 
do in the human body. After much effort, researchers have suc-
ceeded in preventing human embryonic stem cells from differ-
entiating in culture long enough to establish cell lines. This 
outcome has been achieved. What is stilllacking is knowledge 
of precisely what mechanism is at work in preventing differen-
tiation ; how to direct cells to differentiate into specific tissue 
types ; how to control cell growth (suppress tumorogenesis) 
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once differentiation has been achieved; how to get cultured tis -
sues to properly engraft; and then , the most difficult piece, 
how to get them to achieve function in vivo. 
As with the field of gene therapy, the rhetoric advocating 
human embryonic stem cell research steamrolls ahead, hyp-
ing the promise of application, while the state of the science 
and the fundamental understandings of how relevant processes 
work is itself embryonic. Without first conducting more basic 
research, the promise has a higher probability of being bro-
ken than fulfilled. Of course, perhaps such knowledge is not 
necessary. As Nicholas Wade exults : "the magic of regenerative 
medicine is that the physician does not have to know every-
thing, only how to create the right conditions for the body's cells 
to respond to the appropriate signals."34 In addition, one might 
counter that, without the sacrifice of a few frozen embryos, we 
will not be able to conduct basic research and gain the knowl-
edge necessary to better envision and enact the end. The re-
sponse to this claim leads us to the last ofYoder's assumptions , 
namely, that of alternatives. 35 As Yoder notes, the question of 
"what if" is designed to limit the respondents' options to two: 
yes or no, for or against, all or nothing. To set up the discussion 
as if there were only two possible kinds of outcomes (millions 
suffer and die vs. all are saved) or only one route (human em-
bryonic stem cell research) to the desired outcome is to preju-
dice the argument. The situation has been descriptively con-
structed so as to predispose to a particular outcome. 
The posing of alternatives, of course, has been one strategy 
of those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research. To 
advance basic science, many call for further animal research , 
noting that the trajectory in animal studies from in vitro to in 
vivo to therapy is far from complete . Others call for work to 
first be completed, or at least further advanced, with adult 
stem cells befare moving to human embryonic stem cells . 
But the rhetoric of the debate will not brook alternatives. 
Adult stem cells are dismissed by researchers as not totipotent 
and therefore deficient; they are dismissed because (ironically 
enough) not enough research has been done to assess their 
What Would You Do lf . .. ? 1 183 
promise. In the media, adult stem cell research becomes ua ca-
nard,"36 ucrap science," or "baloney."37 Alternative means to a 
shared goal will not be taken seriously. As in most wars, there 
will be no negotiations; there is no middle ground. Thus, ironi-
cally, advocates of human embryonic stem cell research beco me 
absolutist, while their opponents emerge as those searching for 
a compromise that will seek to achieve the ends of protecting 
innocent life and of working to ameliorate the suffering and 
mortality associated with the human condition. 
In the end, the crux of the "what if" question, as well as the 
case made in favor of human embryonic stem cell research, 
bes largely not in rational argument but in emotional appeal. 
As Yoder notes, the question 
appeals to family connections and bonds of love so that it 
becomes a problem of emotions as well as thought. lnstead 
of discussing what is generally right or wrong, it personal-
izes the situation by making it an extension of my own self-
defense. Especially is this emotional dimension of the ques-
tion more visible when the discussion centers on one's duty 
to protect someone else. Often the questioner will heighten 
this aspect of the argument by saying, <(Perhaps as a Christian 
you do have the right to sacrifice your own welfare to be lov-
ing toward an attacker. But do you have the right to sacrifice 
the welfare of others for whom yo u are responsible ?"38 
Classically, these questions are taken up in the just war tradi-
tion, and soto our third analogy 1 now turn. 
JUS IN BELLO: HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 
ANO THE JUST WAR AGAINST DISEASE 
A third case where the Christian tradition has justified the 
sacrifice of human life would be the just war tradition. 39 As 
noted at the outset, the language of the just war is invoked by 
McGee and Caplan. They attempt to argue that, in human 
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embryonic stem cell research, the essence of the embryo-
that is, its DNA-is not destroyed but actually lives on in the 
celllines and potential tissues developed therefrom. What is 
destroyed, they claim, are simply the "inessential components" 
of the embryo-its cytoplasm, external wall, and mitochon-
dria. The reductionistic and gnostic character of these claims 
aside , they conclude: "lt is difficult to imagine those who favor 
just war opposing a.war against such suffering gíven the mea-
ger loss of a few cellular components."40 
How might the just war tradition illuminate our question? 
In the interests of space, 1 willlimit my observations to three. 
Fírst, of our three analogies , the just war tradition provides the 
closest fit with the situation of human embryonic stem cell re-
search. In the model for a just war, a nation-a multitude-
has been attacked or has had its interests threatened. The war 
may entail the loss of innocent life in the defense of the inno-
cent and the common good. Those who answer the call to 
fight do so from a position of innocence, and it is recognized 
that in pursuing the aggressor, innocent civilians on both sides 
might be killed as well as combatants. But, at the same time, 
an obligation to protect those unjustly attacked and to work for 
justice on their behalf is invoked.41 
Furthermore, the context of human embryonic stem cell re-
search mirrors a number of jus ad bellum criteria, the condi-
tions that must be met for a war to be legitimately declared. 
One could make a case that the cause is just-humanity has a 
right to defend itself against the onslaught of disease. The war 
must be declared by a competent, public authority-ín this 
case, perhaps the NIH. The intention must be right, namely, 
the restoration of peace-whích a world free of the ravages of 
dísease approximates. Success must be probable. Apart from 
my earlier skepticism about the probability of moving from 
the laboratory to clinical applications , one could grant, for the 
sake of argument, that human embryonic stem cell research 
has a sufficient prospect of probable success. In light of this , 
one could argue that the principie of proportionalíty ís likewise 
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met- the good expected by pursuing the research outweighs 
the damages to be inflicted in the loss of embryonic life Y 
However, two important criteria remain, both of which are 
essential for validating a particular war as just. The first is a 
finaljus ad hellum condition: that all peaceful alternatives must 
first be exhausted. This is also known as the condition of last 
resort. The debate over alternatives-further animal studies, 
the use of adult stem cells or placenta! stem cells-has been 
discussed above. Until it can be definitively established that all 
nonviolent alternatives have been exhausted, that human em-
bryonic stem cell research truly is a last resort, the analogy to a 
"just war" will fail. This is a process that will take time. 
In addition to the exhaustion of all peaceful alternatives as 
a crucial condition for going to war, the just war tradition also 
provides conditions that must be met during combat, the jus 
in bello criteria. For our purposes, the key condition is that of 
discrimination or noncombatant immunity. The principie of 
discrimination protects the immunity of noncombatants by re-
stricting direct targeting to combatants, military installations , 
and factories whose products are directly related to the war 
effort. As Aquinas notes in his discussion of war: "those who 
are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on ac-
count of sorne fault. "43 Noncombatants are not to be targeted. 
J ust warriors realize that, in the course of attacking legitima te 
targets , innocent noncombatants may be killed. But within the 
tradition, a most important moral distinction obtains between 
recognizing that noncombatants may accidentally and tragi-
cally be killed and directly targeting those noncombatants. 
In the case of human embryonic stem cell research, frozen 
embryos occupy the place in the analogy of noncombatants. lt 
cannot be argued that the loss of embryonic life is an unin-
tended, indirect, and accidental by-product of the activities of 
the research. For this is what is at stake, the ending of embry-
onic life-not, contra McGee and Caplan, simply the loss of 
embryonic identity. Human embryonic stem cell research di-
rectly targets the lives of human embryos-frozen though they 
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may be, slated for disposal though they may be-in order to 
achieve the ends of the war. Within the just war tradition, this 
means to a good end would not be licit. I t would be total war. 
Finally, the just war tradition reflects the commitments of 
the Christian tradition from which it emerged. As Aquinas 
notes , "Those who wage war justly aim at peace."44 The imper-
fect peace obtainable in this world is considered to be the nor-
mative human condition, and war is reluctantly admitted into 
the realm of possibility in order to restore natural order and 
harmony. Aquinas's discussion of war is located, in the Summa, 
not under the heading of justice, where one might expect to 
find it, but rather under the heading of charity. War is properly 
categorized as sin, a vice, a violation of the virtue of charity, of 
the friendship between humans and God that is, within the 
human community, made possible by the incarnation. Cog-
nizant of this , the just war tradition seeks notas much to carve 
out a space for the legitimacy of war but rather to create pa-
rameters that will severely limit it. 
WAR AND PEACE 
In so limiting the legitima te taking of human life in war or self-
defense, the Christian tradition fails to provide moral criteria 
that would justify directly and intentionally taking innocent 
human life. By illuminating the operative assumptions of the 
human embryonic stem cell debate, analysis of the classic situ-
ation of defense of the neighbor renders that particular analogy 
similarly unhelpful. In each of the three analogies, a case might 
be made for taking the life of the aggressor. But no moral cri-
teria emerge that would justify sacrificing the life of one not 
party to the conflict, even in order to save the life of another. 
One is free to sacrifice one's own life-one may find oneself 
called to be a martyr-but neither an individual nor public 
authorities may justifiably sacrifice the life of even one inno-
cent person, even for the sake of the common good. Therefore, 
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as long as we hold that human embryos qualify as human life, 
"sacrificing" them is notan available moral option. 
Ken Woodward reminds us that "the words we choose to 
frame our arguments reveal the moral universe we inhabit," and 
it is with this thought that 1 would like to close. 45 McGee and 
Caplan end their article echoing Woodward's claim. They state: 
The issues here are novel and they are hard, but mostly they 
require philosophical innovation about what an embryo is 
and how we are to treat embryonic material in a time of stem 
cell research [ one hears the resanan ce: "in a time of war"]. 
Our argument here is that no embryo need be sacrificed, but 
we must alter the terms and goals of our debate to frame an 
appropriate moral framework for dealing with embryos. 46 
In other words, McGee and Caplan propase to resolve this 
particular moral controversy by redefining the terms-what 
an embryo is , what it means to kili. They propase to create a 
different story to describe what we are doing. This is a classic 
tactic in wartime: to dehumanize the other, to craft a narrative 
that justifies the necessary use of lethal force, and to tell our-
selves that we do it in arder to protect the community's high-
est ideals and most pressing interests. They suggest that the 
way out of the dilemma is to descriptively construct the prac-
tice of human embryonic stem cell research so as to predis-
pose toa particular outcome. 
1 cannot but agree that a necessary step forward toward re-
solving the debate over human embryonic stem cell research is 
the narrative task of redescription. I opened this paper with a 
passage from St. Luke, and that passage points to a funda-
mentally different narrative frame for the debate about human 
embryonic stem cells , in particular, and biotech and clinical 
research more generally. St. Luke reminds us that, for Chris-
tians, healing is understood not in relation to war but in rela-
tion to peace. 47 Healing, that practice rightly privileged as a 
central and enduring commitment for Christian identity and 
\ 
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communities, is not, within a Christian narrative, an end in it-
self. Rather, healing is a sign of the "reign of God," a practice 
rooted in the identity and actions of the God of pea ce. For 
Christians, the healing that we pursue must be anchored in 
the broader context of God' s work in the world and our partici-
pation therein. If we abstract the commitment to healing from 
its narrative context, we are left with a formal claim that be-
comes an end in itself, to which any and all means might be 
fitted, even the means of killing embryos. In the end, topara-
phrase Yoder, I do not know what I would do if one of my 
children needed the products of human em bryonic stem cell 
research. But I know that what I ought todo should be illumi-
nated by the story of the Trinitarian God, whose story is one 
of peace, healing, and compassion-the difficult activity of 
suffering with those who suffer precisely because, want as we 
might, we cannot eliminate that suffering. 48 
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readings. Little did 1 anticipa te that October 18, 2001 -the day the confer-
ence opened-would turn out to be the Feast of St. Luke, Evangelist, who 
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